

# Robot-Ethics Background for OFAI Position Paper ("Engineer at the level of the OS!")

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
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OFAI  
Vienna, AT  
9/27/2013



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the generosity of:



RPI's pursuit of ITS/IILE



ONR x 2



DARPA

Infinitary (AoI 2) 

$L_{\omega, \omega}$

Logic

FOL

SOL

epistemic

temporal

heterogeneous/visual

temporal+epistemic

temporal+epistemic+deontic

+planning+arg semantics

⋮



Art of Infallibility I

propositional logic

semantic-web logics

description logics

fragments of FOL

UIMA output



MiniMaxularity

⋮

# Infinitary (AoI 2)

***DCEC*\***  
Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus  
(with Castañeda's \*)

- 1. natural language semantics (non-Montagovian)
- 2. higher-cognition tests (for Psychometric AI)  
(false-belief test, deliberative mind-reading, mirror test for self-consciousness ...)
- 3. ethically correct robots
- 4. big & econ simulation

Goodstein's Theorem: 



$L_{\omega_1, \omega}$



MiniMaxularity

Vivid

AI- Axiomatic Physics!  
(Synthese) 

FOL 

Logic 



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...

ITS (Culture, Language, Math)

Gödel's "God Theorem"

Art of Infallibility I




What is AI for you?



Elevated AI only!:

“The ultimate goal of AI is to build a person, or more humbly, an animal.” —C&M

Infinitary (Aol 2)



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Art of Infallibility I



Infinitary (AoI 2) 

Darwinian "Canine" AI 

$L_{\omega, \omega}$

Logic

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Art of Infallibility I


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MiniMaxularity

...


Infinitary (AoI 2) 



$L_{\omega, \omega}$



“Monkey” AI



MiniMaxularity

Logic

FOL

epistemic

temporal

heterogeneous/visual

temporal+epistemic


temporal+epistemic+deontic

+planning+arg semantics

⋮



Art of Infallibility I



propositional logic

semantic-web logics

description logics

fragments of FOL

UIMA output

⋮

Infinitary (AoI 2) 



“Full-Watson” AI



MiniMaxularity

$L_{\omega, \omega}$

Logic

FOL

SOL

propositional logic

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fragments of FOL

UIMA output

...

epistemic

temporal

heterogeneous/visual


temporal+epistemic

temporal+epistemic+deontic

+planning+arg semantics

...

Art of Infallibility I



Infinitary (AoI 2) 

Person-Aspiring AI 

Logic

$L_{\omega 1, \omega}$

FOL

epistemic

temporal

heterogeneous/visual

temporal+epistemic

temporal+epistemic+deontic

+planning+arg semantics

⋮



Art of Infallibility I


propositional logic

semantic-web logics

description logics

fragments of FOL

UIMA output



MiniMaxularity


⋮

# Analogico-Deductive Moral Reasoning (ADMR)

- Moral problem presented as *story* (in psychometric sense) and a *stem*, or *query*.
- A *stem* has correct answer **A** and a set  $P_i$  of correct proofs or arguments establishing **A**, relative to:
  - An associated implicit moral theory, and
  - A corresponding moral code

But moral *dilemmas* often have multiple theory codes, and competing answers!

# Analogico-Deductive Moral Reasoning (ADMR)



⋮

Moral Dilemma  $D_k$

Solution to  $D_{k-1}$

⋮

Moral Dilemma  $D_3$

Solution to  $D_2$

Moral Dilemma  $D_2$

Solution to  $D_1$

Moral Dilemma  $D_1$

⋮

Moral Problem  $P_k$

Solution to  $P_{k-1}$

⋮

Moral Problem  $P_3$

Solution to  $P_2$

Moral Problem  $P_2$

Solution to  $P_1$

Moral Problem  $P_1$

eg, Heinz Dilemma


Machine

Solution



But can this be done in a  
*cognitively-psychologically realistic way?*

# CLARION Subsystems



# The Heinz Dilemma (Kohlberg)

“In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug.

The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.” So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife. *Should the husband have done that?*”

# A simple example in DCEC\*

$$\mathbf{P}_1 \quad \forall t : \text{Moment}, a : \text{Agent} \left( \text{holds}(\text{sick}(a), t) \wedge \left( \forall t' : \text{Moment } t' < T \Rightarrow \neg \text{happens}(\text{treated}(a), t + t') \right) \right. \\ \left. \Rightarrow (\text{happens}(\text{dies}(a), t + T) \vee \text{holds}(\text{dead}(a), t + T)) \right)$$

$$\mathbf{P}_2 \quad \text{holds}(\text{sick}(\text{wife}(\mathbf{l}^*)), t_0) \wedge \left( \forall t' : \text{Moment } t' < T \Rightarrow \neg \text{happens}(\text{treated}(\text{wife}(\mathbf{l}^*)), t_0 + t') \right)$$

---

$$\mathbf{Q} \quad \text{happens}(\text{dies}(\text{wife}(\mathbf{l}^*)), t_0 + T) \vee \text{holds}(\text{dead}(\text{wife}(\mathbf{l}^*)), t_0 + T)$$

Note: This adheres strictly to the syntax of DCEC\*

# PI in CLARION's NACS (simplified version)

**(forall (t,a) (if (and (holds (sick a) t) (forall t' (if (< t' T) (not (happens (treated a) (+ t t')))))) (or (happens (dies a) (+ t T)) (holds (dead a) (+ t T))))))**

**(if (and (holds (sick a) t) (forall t' (if (< t' T) (not (happens (treated a) (+ t t')))))) (or (happens (dies a) (+ t T)) (holds (dead a) (+ t T))))**

**(and (holds (sick a) t) (forall t' (if (< t' T) (not (happens (treated a) (+ t t'))))))**

**(or (happens (dies a) (+ t T)) (holds (dead a) (+ t T)))**

**(holds (sick a) t)**

**(forall t' (if (< t' T) (not (happens (treated a) (+ t t')))))**

**(happens (dies a) (+ t T))**

**(holds (dead a) (+ t T))**

**(sick a)**

**(if (< t' T) (not (happens (treated a) (+ t t'))))**

**(dies a)**

**(dead a)**

**(< t' T)**

**(not (happens (treated a) (+ t t')))**

**(happens (treated a) (+ t t'))**

**(+ t T)**

**(treated a)**



**(+ t t')**

**a**

**t'**

**t**

**T**



# We may need the DCEC\*: Far beyond the reach of all cognitive architectures (at the moment)

## Syntax

$S ::=$  Object | Agent | Self  $\sqsubset$  Agent | ActionType | Action  $\sqsubseteq$  Event |  
Moment | Boolean | Fluent | Numeric

$t ::= x : S \mid c : S \mid f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$

$p : \text{Boolean} \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi \mid \phi \vee \psi \mid \phi \rightarrow \psi \mid \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \mid \forall x : S. \phi \mid \exists x : S. \phi$

$\phi ::=$   $\mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, b, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, t, \phi)$   
 $\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{D}(a, t, \text{holds}(f, t')) \mid \mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$   
 $\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$

$\text{action} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \rightarrow \text{Action}$

$\text{initially} : \text{Fluent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{holds} : \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{happens} : \text{Event} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{clipped} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{initiates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{terminates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{prior} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{interval} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Boolean}$

$*$  : Agent  $\rightarrow$  Self

$\text{payoff} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Numeric}$

## Rules of Inference

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi))} [R_1] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi))} [R_2]$

$\frac{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \quad t \leq t_1 \dots t \leq t_n}{\mathbf{K}(a_1, t_1, \dots \mathbf{K}(a_n, t_n, \phi) \dots)} [R_3] \quad \frac{\mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi)}{\phi} [R_4]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{K}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_5]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{B}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{B}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_6]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{C}(t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{C}(t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{C}(t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_7]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \forall x. \phi \rightarrow \phi[x \mapsto t])} [R_8] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi_1 \leftrightarrow \phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_1)} [R_9]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, [\phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n \rightarrow \phi] \rightarrow [\phi_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \phi_n \rightarrow \psi])} [R_{10}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi \rightarrow \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)} [R_{11a}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi \wedge \phi)} [R_{11b}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{S}(s, h, t, \phi)}{\mathbf{B}(h, t, \mathbf{B}(s, t, \phi))} [R_{12}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))}{\mathbf{P}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t))} [R_{13}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \mathbf{O}(a^*, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t')))}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))} [R_{14}]$

$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \psi}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \gamma) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{O}(a, t, \psi, \gamma)} [R_{15}]$

# More Complex DCEC\* Specimen from Heinz Dilemma

$$\text{Given } \mathbf{B} \left( l, \text{now}, \forall t : \text{Moment}, a : \text{Agent} \left( \text{holds}(\text{sick}(a), t) \wedge \left( \forall t' : \text{Moment } t' < T \Rightarrow \neg \text{happens}(\text{treated}(a), t + t') \right) \right) \right. \\ \left. \Rightarrow (\text{happens}(\text{dies}(a), t + T) \vee \text{holds}(\text{dead}(a), t + T)) \right)$$

$$\text{Given } \mathbf{K} \left( l, \text{now}, \text{holds}(\text{sick}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t_0) \wedge \left( \forall t' : \text{Moment } t' < T \Rightarrow \neg \text{happens}(\text{treated}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t + t') \right) \right)$$

---


$$\text{Inferred } \mathbf{B} \left( l, \text{now}, \text{happens}(\text{dies}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t_0 + T) \vee \text{holds}(\text{dead}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t_0 + T) \right)$$

$$\text{Given } \mathbf{K} \left( l, \text{now}, \text{EventCalculus} \Rightarrow \right.$$

$$\left. (\text{happens}(\text{dies}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t_0 + T) \vee \text{holds}(\text{dead}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t_0 + T) \Rightarrow \neg \text{holds}(\text{alive}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t_0 + T)) \right)$$

---


$$\text{Inferred } \mathbf{B} \left( l, \text{now}, \neg \text{holds}(\text{alive}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t_0 + T) \right)$$

$$\text{Given } \mathbf{D} \left( l, \text{now}, \text{holds}(\text{alive}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t_0 + T) \right)$$


$$\text{Given } (\mathbf{B} \left( l, \text{now}, \neg \text{holds}(f, t) \right) \wedge \mathbf{D} \left( l, \text{now}, \text{holds}(f, t) \right) \wedge \\ \mathbf{K} \left( l, \text{now}, \text{happens}(\text{action}(l^*, \alpha), \text{now}) \Rightarrow \text{holds}(f, t) \right)) \\ \Rightarrow \mathbf{I} \left( l, \text{now}, \text{happens}(\text{action}(l^*, \alpha), \text{now}) \right)$$

$$\text{Given } \mathbf{K} \left( l, \text{now}, \text{happens}(\text{action}(l^*, \text{treat}), \text{now}) \Rightarrow \text{holds}(\text{alive}(\text{wife}(l^*)), t_0 + T) \right)$$

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

$$\text{Inferred } \mathbf{I} \left( l, \text{now}, \text{happens}(\text{action}(l^*, \text{treat}), \text{now}) \right)$$

# The Overall Approach



# Automation of Reasoning

## Denotational Proof Languages



DPLs for  $\mathcal{DCEC}^*$  under construction ...

K. Arkoudas. *Denotational Proof Languages*. PhD thesis, MIT, 2000.

K. Arkoudas and S. Bringsjord. Propositional Attitudes and Causation. *International Journal of Software and Informatics*, 3(1):47–65, 2009.

# Logicist NLP

Two Major Approaches

Deep Modeling

Controlled English


On Deep Computational Formalization of Natural Language

Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu, John Licato and Selmer Bringsjord

Workshop on Formalizing Mechanisms for Artificial General Intelligence, 2013, AGI 2013



# Deep Modeling



# Controlled English

$\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^*$  corresponds to a subset of English!

RLCNL: RAIR Lab Controlled Natural Language

$\mathbf{K}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \textit{holds}(\textit{carrying}(\text{ugv}, \text{soldier}), \text{now}))$

The ugv now knows that the fluent, 'the ugv is carrying the soldier,' holds now.

$\mathbf{B}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \mathbf{B}(\text{commander}, t_1, \neg \mathbf{P}(\text{ugv}, \text{anytime}, \textit{happens}(\textit{firefight}, \text{anytime}))))$

The ugv now believes that the commander at moment  $t_1$  believes that it is not the case that the ugv at any time perceives that a firefight happens at any time.

$\mathbf{K}(\text{I}, \text{now}, \mathbf{O}(\text{I}^*, \text{now}, \textit{mission}(\textit{main}), \textit{happens}(\textit{action}(\text{I}^*, \text{silence}), \text{alltime}))))$

I now know that it is obligatory for myself under the condition that the main mission being carried out, that I myself should see to it that silence is maintained at all times.